Device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) provides the strongest form of secure key exchange, using only the input-output statistics of the devices to obtain information-theoretic security. Although the security principles of DI-QKD are now well-understood, it remains a technical challenge to derive reliable security bounds for generic DI-QKD protocols beyond the standard ones. In this Letter, we present a numerical framework based on semidefinite programming that provides reliable lower bounds on the asymptotic secret key rate of any QKD protocol with untrusted devices. In particular, our method can be applied to obtain secret key rates from any Bell inequality.
INTRODUCTION
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) is the art of exchanging secret keys using devices which are untrusted or imperfect [1, 2] . In this framework, security is based solely on the observation of nonlocal correlations-therefore, it is not necessary to know precisely how the devices behave during the protocol execution. Indeed, sufficiently strong violation of some Bell inequalities [3] indicates that the devices possess strong entanglement [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , an ingredient which is essential for secure key distribution [9, 10] . For this reason, DI-QKDbesides its foundational significance-also has a practical appeal: it may lead to QKD protocols which are highly resistant against implementation loopholes [11] .
While the concept of DI-QKD can be easily appreciated from the unique monogamy property of non-local correlations [12] , a formal security analysis can be involved and tricky. This is because the dimension of the underlying shared quantum state is unknown and many existing security proof techniques only apply to qubitlevel systems. In this Letter, we present a numerical toolbox to address this difficulty, computing reliable lower bounds on the secret key rate of DI-QKD.
Recently, similar toolboxes [13] [14] [15] were proposed for standard QKD, which is device-dependent (DD). Our approach covers a wider range of scenarios, adapting to different levels of device characterization (see Fig. 1 ). At present, to prove the security of DI-QKD, the existing approaches are either to show that it is sufficient to consider Bell-diagonal qubit-level systems and then directly compute the Holevo quantity between the adversary and the key [1] , or to use the Navascués-Pironio-Acín (NPA) hierarchy [16] to bound the adversary's guessing probability [17, 18] . However, neither of these approaches is truly satisfactory: the former is currently limited to DI-QKD protocols based on specific Bell inequalities with binary inputs and outputs, while the latter only yields bounds on the min-entropy, which is a potentially overly
FIG. 1. Classes of assumptions:
Under device-dependent (DD) assumptions, all measurements and their underlying local Hilbert spaces are characterized. Under fully deviceindependent (DI) assumptions, none of these are known, and we only assume the validity of quantum mechanics. Semidevice-independent (sDI) assumptions lie between these two cases, by having partial characterizations of the measurements. In this work, we focus on sDI scenarios where one party's measurements are fully characterized while the other's are unknown [19, 20] .
pessimistic lower bound on the von Neumann entropy (recently shown [2] to be the relevant quantity for evaluating the secret key rate against general sequential attacks). In short, the existing approaches are either too restrictive or may lead to suboptimal key rates. Our toolbox is more generally applicable and bounds the von Neumann entropy directly, using the full outcome distribution from a DI-QKD setup (in particular, it can be applied to any Bell inequality for that setup).
The main mechanism of our toolbox is a new method for estimating the entropy production of a quantum channel on an unknown state under algebraic constraints. The
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full details of this are described in a separate publication [21] . Here, we focus on its application to DI-QKD. Conceptually, our method enables us to estimate this entropy production via a polynomial optimization on the free *-algebra generated by all measurement operators involved in a specific protocol. Using this approach, we can then algebraically capture the problem of optimizing over all measurements and states of unknown dimension. Consequently, this gives rise to bounds which can be computed as SDPs, via the NPA hierarchy [16] . Using this framework, adding more assumptions on an implementation (like switching from DI to sDI or DD scenarios) corresponds to a more specific description of the corresponding *-algebra; this translates into more constraints on the SDPs and hence tighter bounds on the resulting key rates.
SETTING AND METHODS

FIG. 2. Basic situation:
By measuring her share of the joint state ψABE with a measurement A0, Alice is (virtually) sending a raw key to Bob who (virtually) receives it by measuring B0. Bob's uncertainty on his received key is quantified by the classical conditional entropy H(A0|B0). Meanwhile Eve has access to all classical communication and her share of the joint quantum state, which gives her some partial information on A0 as well. This is quantified by the classical-quantum conditional entropy H(A0|E).
To assess the performance of some QKD protocol, one can start by finding the asymptotic key rate r ∞ under the assumption of independent and identically distributed (IID) states. This is a first estimate of what might be achieved after accounting for finite-size and non-IID effects.
In this setting, we consider QKD protocols that can be modelled as follows: in each round, Alice and Bob share a quantum state ρ AB , and Eve's side-information E is described by the purification ψ ABE of ρ AB (see Fig. 2 ). Intuitively, this means that she has full control of all parts of the quantum system that are not in the labs of Alice and Bob. In each round, Alice performs one measurement from a set {A 0 , A 1 , . . . A X −1 } on the local system in her possession, and similarly Bob performs a measurement from {B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B Y−1 }. The raw key will be produced from the measurements (A 0 , B 0 ). This picture is an essential part of entanglement-based protocols, but can also be used to prove security in the prepare-and-measure setting using the technique described in [22, 23] . In this work, we restrict our discussion to protocols that use oneway error correction. Devetak and Winter proved [24] that the asymptotic key rate for such protocols is given by the intuitive formula
which can be qualitatively interpreted as the difference between Eve's and Bob's knowledge about Alice's keygenerating measurement A 0 . The H(A 0 |B 0 ) term in Eq. (1) can be computed based on the expected behaviour of the devices (see [2] for details), so the main challenge is to bound H(A 0 |E) based on the statistics observed from the various measurements. Specifically, suppose the protocol involves estimating parameters of the form l j = abxy c (j) abxy Pr(ab|xy) for some coefficients c
abxy , where Pr(ab|xy) is the probability of outcome (a, b) from measurements (A x , B y ). (For instance, these parameters could be Bell inequalities in a DI scenario.) Let P a|x denote the projector [25] corresponding to outcome a of Alice's measurement A x , and analogously, let P b|y denote Bob's measurement projectors. The task is then to find lower bounds on
where
abxy P a|x ⊗ P b|y , and the infimum takes place over ψ ABE and any uncharacterized measurements (which may be some or all of the measurements, for sDI and DI scenarios respectively). For the uncharacterized measurements, even their dimensions may not be known. The focus of our work is a method to tackle this task despite this difficulty [26] , and we present this result later as Theorem 1.
To instead prove security of finite-length protocols against general attacks, one could in principle use approaches based on de Finetti theorems [27, 28] to reduce the analysis of many DD protocols to the IID case. Those approaches do not easily generalise to DI protocols, but the recently developed entropy accumulation theorem [2, 29] shows that even for DI protocols, the key rate against general sequential attacks is still of a form essentially similar to Eq. (1). The theorem greatly simplifies the analysis of such scenarios, because it inherently accounts for finite-size and non-IID effects, and reduces the main challenge in a security proof to a task similar to the IID case-namely, bounding H(A 0 |E) subject to constraints of the form L J = l j (see [2, 29, 30] for details). Our approach can hence also be used to compute finite key lengths against general sequential attacks, by applying the entropy accumulation theorem to our results.
Eve's side-information as entropy production on ρAB The advantage of quantum over classical cryptography stems from the fact that for a quantum system it is possible to bound Eve's knowledge, given only access to the Alice-Bob subsystem. To make this precise for H(A 0 |E), we regard the key-generating measurement as a quantum-to-classical channel that maps Alice's (quantum) system A to a memory register A 0 that stores the (classical) measurement outcomes. By Stinepring's theorem [31] , we can describe the action of this channel with an isometry V to an expanded system A 0 A . This isometry maps our initial global pure state Ψ ABE to a pure final state Ψ A BEA0 (see Fig. 3 ).
Since the entropies of the two sides of a bipartite pure state are equal, we have
and hence we can write
. At this point, it is important to notice that the last line of Eq. (4) only depends on the reduced state on the Alice-Bob system. Hence Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's knowledge by only observing quantities involving their own systems. Furthermore, the last line of Eq. (4) can be interpreted as entropy production ∆H resulting from the transformation AB → A B. For projective measurements, a short computation [15, 21] shows we can choose V such that T is the pinching channel
Bounding the entropy production
Besides its application to QKD as outlined above, the amount of entropy that is produced or consumed by a quantum operation T is one of the central quantities that allows us to describe many other relevant properties of a physical system. This will be elaborated on in greater detail in a second publication [21] . Nonetheless, finding such a change of entropy in practice is not a straightforward task, since the von Neumann entropy of a quantum state is not a directly accessible quantity. Instead, the quantities that are directly accessible are typically the expectation values of certain observables, i.e. expressions of the form L j ρ = tr(ρL j ) for operators L j (which in QKD scenarios have the form described earlier). Following this perspective, we have to study [21] the following   FIG. 3 . Connection to entropy production: The keygenerating measurement is regarded as an isometry to a larger Hilbert space, by expanding the classical memory A0 with an ancillary system A . From this perspective the global state before and after the measurement is pure, and thus the entropy change ∆H on the memory-Eve subsystem equals the entropy change on the Alice-Bob subsystem. This allows us to bound H(A0|E) by characterizing only the Alice-Bob subsystem, i.e. without accessing Eve's subsystem.
problem: find bounds on ∆H that hold for all states consistent with observed constraints L j ρ = l j . For the purposes of QKD, these bounds have to be lower bounds, since we want to consider a worst-case scenario for the action of Eve.
To tackle this task, we propose the following ansatz: for coefficients λ j ∈ R, we define L = j λ j L j and aim to find an operator K (constructed from L) such that [32] 
holds for all states. Note that the constraints fix the value of L ρ as j λ j l j . Such an expression arises in the Lagrange dual of the constrained optimisation we have described, and also bears some similarities to the approach used in [33] to derive an entropic uncertainty relation. To find such a K, we first note that Jensen's operator inequality and the Gibbs variational principle imply [21] 
where T * T denotes the composition of T with its adjoint channel T * . Applying a recently discovered generalisation of the Golden-Thompson inequality [34] to the trace term in Eq. (8), it follows [21] that for any self-adjoint operators X k such that L = k X k , we can choose
where β 0 (t) = (π/2)(cosh(πt) + 1) −1 . This approach hence yields a family of lower bounds on H (T [ρ])−H(ρ), parametrised by the choices of λ j and X k (as well as the ordering of the operator product).
Our task is now reduced to finding upper bounds on K ρ . Such bounds can be found by either measuring K ρ directly, if possible, or by bounding the maximum value of K ρ subject to the constraints L j ρ = l j . If explicit representations of K and L j as matrices are known, as is the case in a DD scenario, the latter is simply an SDP in standard form. The resulting bound is then very similar to that derived in [13] , except that we have used the generalized Golden-Thompson inequality instead of the standard one. It is, however, unlikely to outperform the bounds in [14, 15] , which were constructed to be essentially tight.
For sDI and DI scenarios, we do not know the explicit forms of L j and therefore K, since the measurements are not fully characterized. To handle this, we choose X xy = abj λ j c (j) abxy P a|x ⊗P b|y and obtain the main result in our toolbox: Theorem 1. For a DI scenario as described, the minimum value of H(A 0 |E) (in base e), subject to constraints
The key observation that lets us use Theorem 1 to compute reliable bounds is that K is now a noncommutative polynomial in the measurement operators (the integrals can be evaluated in closed form). Therefore, the task of maximizing K ρ over all states and measurements satisfying L j ρ = l j can be tackled using the family of SDPs known as the NPA hierarchy [16] , which yields a sequence of increasingly tight upper bounds on this value. For sDI scenarios, we can impose additional algebraic constraints corresponding to those satisfied by the characterized measurements. We note that since the optimization over λ is a supremum, any value of λ yields a reliable lower bound on H(A 0 |E), without needing to solve for the optimal λ.
APPLICATIONS
We now apply our method to two commonly studied DI scenarios, in which Alice and Bob each perform parameter estimation on 2 binary-outcome measurements [35] .   FIG. 4 . sDI six-state protocol: We apply our method to obtain a lower bound on H(A0|E) for an sDI version of the six-state protocol [40] . Interestingly, the bound we obtain coincides with that for the BB84 protocol. For reference, we also show the bound that could be obtained from a tomographically complete characterisation of the state, such as via the measurements in the standard (device-dependent) six-state protocol.
(See [21] for our results in some other scenarios, including distributions optimised for tilted CHSH inequalities [36] .) The first scenario [1] corresponds to performing the ideal CHSH measurements on the Werner state (1 − 2q)|Ψ − Ψ − | + (q/2)I, parametrised by a depolarising-noise value q ∈ [0, 1/2]. The second scenario is a limited-detector-efficiency model parametrised by η ∈ [0, 1], where for every measurement the outcome 1 is flipped to 0 with probability 1 − η. This is a simplistic model for a photonic setup where failure to detect a photon is mapped to the outcome 0. For this scenario, we use a different set of states and measurements for each value of η, chosen to maximize the CHSH value as described in [37] . The best known bound on H(A 0 |E) in these two scenarios [38] is that derived in [1] , which uses only the CHSH value. To make use of the full output distribution instead, the only general approach previously known [17, 18] was to first bound the guessing probability P g (A 0 |E), then apply the inequality H(A 0 |E) ≥ − ln P g (A 0 |E). We note that if the marginal distribution of A 0 is uniform and binary-valued, then in fact the tighter inequality H(A 0 |E) ≥ (2 ln 2)(1 − P g (A 0 |E)) holds [39] , and we use this bound in Fig. 5 . However, P g (A 0 |E)-based approaches do not outperform the bound in [1] for the two scenarios considered here.
Our method uses the full output distribution to bound H(A 0 |E) directly. As shown in Fig. 5 , we find that it gives results that are close to or slightly outperform the bound from [1] . Roughly speaking, our approach tends to perform well for moderate noise values, which is useful since many Bell-test implementations are currently in such noise regimes [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] . Our results confirm that for the limited-detector-efficiency scenario, better bounds on FIG. 5. 2-input 2-output DI protocols: Lower bounds on H(A0|E) (in base 2) as a function of depolarising noise (for the scenario studied in [1] ) or detector efficiency (for the scenario studied in [37] ). Our approach yields bounds close to or slightly better than the best known result [1] for these scenarios, which was based on the CHSH value alone. For comparison, we also show the indirect bound based on Pg(A0|E).
H(A 0 |E) can be obtained by considering the full distribution rather than just the CHSH value.
We also analyze an sDI version of the six-state protocol [40] where Bob's measurement device is uncharacterized. As mentioned earlier, the characterization of Alice's device translates to additional constraints in our SDP. More precisely, we use the algebraic structures of A x to formulate additional linear constraints on top of the NPA hierarchy. As shown in Fig. 4 , the resulting bound coincides with the bound for the BB84 protocol. This supports a conjecture [46] that when Bob's measurements are uncharacterized, performing three measurements does not offer any additional advantage over performing only two measurements.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In summary, we have devised a method to obtain reliable secret key rates for QKD with untrusted devices. The advantage of our method as compared to the approach in [1] is that in principle, it can be applied to arbitrary DI-QKD scenarios, not only those based on specialized Bell inequalities. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing approach that can be applied with such generality is based on bounding the guessing probability P g (A 0 |E) instead [17, 18] , which then yields indirect bounds on H(A 0 |E). Our method manages to outperform both of these approaches in some cases, as shown in Fig. 5 . Importantly, it gives good results in regimes with substantial noise, which are likely to be experimentally relevant.
Currently, our method scales rapidly in computational difficulty as the number of inputs or outputs for the protocol increases-the operator polynomial in Eq. (11) is generally of high order, which necessitates the use of a high level of the NPA hierarchy [16] in order to bound K ρ . Because of this, we currently do not have good bounds for DI scenarios with large numbers of inputs or outputs (though we find suboptimal bounds for some such cases in [21] ). A particularly significant family of 3-output scenarios to analyse would be photonic setups where a no-detection event is not absorbed into either a 0 or 1 outcome, but is instead labelled separately. An important goal now would hence be to find ways to improve the tractability of our approach, perhaps by following reductions along the lines of those described in [47] . This would enable the computation of key rates for DI-QKD protocols with more measurement settings and/or outcomes, and at the same time, yield good bounds on the secret key rate in the noise regime that is representative of present experimental conditions.
